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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 21, 2014, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, an Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) spokesman, broadcasted on Twitter a 
speech entitled “Indeed, You Lord is Ever Watchful,” calling upon ISIS 
followers to, 
If you can kill a disbelieving American or European, 
especially the spiteful and filthy French, or an 
Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from 
the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the 
countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic 
State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner 
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or way however it may be.  Do not ask for anyone’s 
advice and do not seek anyone’s verdict. Kill the 
disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they 
have the same ruling. Both of them are disbelievers. 
Both of them are considered to be waging war [the 
civilian by belonging to a state waging war against the 
Muslims]. Both of their blood and wealth is legal for you 
to destroy, for blood does not become illegal or legal to 
spill by the clothes being worn.1 
This speech was a direct message to ISIS followers to launch attacks 
on civilians in countries opposing ISIS.2 
In his speech, al-Adnani declared the military intervention by the 
U.S.-led coalition forces as the “final campaign of the crusaders.”3  “It 
will be broken and defeated, just as all your previous campaigns were 
broken and defeated, except that this time we will raid you thereafter, 
and you will never raid us,” al-Adnani stated.4  Al-Adnani urged all 
“Muslims to take action and show their support for ISIS through 
violence.”5  In concluding the nearly 43-minute speech, al-Adnani 
“promised retribution for [the coalition forces] intervention, and to bring 
the war to their soil.”6 
O Americans, and O Europeans, the Islamic State did 
not initiate a war against you, as your governments and 
media try to make you believe. It is you who started the 
transgression against us, and thus you deserve blame and 
you will pay a great price.  You will pay the price when 
your economies collapse.  You will pay the price when 
your sons are sent to wage war against us and they return 
to you as disabled amputees, or inside coffins, or 
mentally ill.  You will pay the price as you are afraid of 
traveling to any land.  Rather you will pay the price as 
you walk on your streets, turning right and left, fearing 
the Muslims.  You will not feel secure even in your 
bedrooms.  You will pay the price when this crusade of 
yours collapses, and thereafter we will strike you in your 
                                                                                                             
1 ISIS Audio Urges Muslims Everywhere to Kill ‘Unbelievers,’ HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 21, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/09/21/isis-audio-threat-
canada_n_5859062.html. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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homeland, and you will never be able to harm anyone 
afterwards.  You will pay the price, and we have 
prepared for you what will pain you.7 
Threats from the Islamic State (IS) have become increasingly more 
profound and numerous over the past couple of years.8 IS has not stopped 
at verbal threats but has also acted out against the United States (U.S.) 
and other coalition forces through physical acts of violence.9  These 
threats and acts of violence have plagued American news outlets 
seemingly uninterrupted for the past year.  These actions have included 
the burning of a Jordanian pilot, Lt. Moath Al-Kasasbeh, in February of 
2015,10 the execution of American journalists James Foley and Steven 
Sotloff in August 2014,11 the sale of Iraqi children as slaves,12 and the 
enslavement, rape, and sale of female captives who were described as 
“nonbelievers.”13 
While the world looks on at the catastrophe that consumes the 
Middle East, many Americans may find themselves wondering why the 
U.S. is not being more proactive in dealing with the atrocities being 
committed by IS.  Why does it seem that the U.S. is sitting idly by 
waiting for IS to strike again and again?  What many Americans do not 
know or understand is that the U.S. and other coalition forces have laws 
on how and when they can engage with terrorist groups such as IS. 
It is not as simple as the President of the United States quickly and 
single-handedly deciding to react to the threats and acts of violence by 
IS.  In making any decision to act, the President must comply with all 
international laws, the laws of armed conflict, and domestic laws.14  
These laws provide the legal basis by which the U.S. and other States 
                                                                                                             
7 Id. 
8 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and The Islamic State (IS) are different 
names for the same organization. The changes in name are discussed in section II. 
9 See infra notes 10-13. 
10 Walid Shoebat, Jordanian Pilot Burned Alive by ISIS- Will Not Submit!, FREEDOM 
OUTPOST (Feb. 3, 2015), http://freedomoutpost.com/2015/02/jordanian-pilot-burned-isis-
will-not-submit/. 
11 Kacie Yearout, ISIS vs ISIL- What’s the Difference, WCSH6 (Sept. 11, 2014, 8:04 
PM), http://www.wcsh6.com/story/news/local/2014/09/10/isis-vs-isil-islamic-state-iraq-
syria/15403133/. 
12 Faith Karimi & Greg Botelho, ISIS Putting Price Tags on Iraqi Children, Selling 
Them as Slaves, U.N. Says, CNN (Feb. 6, 2015, 4:26 PM), http://www.cnn.com
/2015/02/06/world/isis-children-torture/. 
13 Id. 
14 This article will not focus on whether the United States has domestic authorization 
to act in Syria against the Islamic State. Instead, this article will focus on whether the 
United States has a legal basis under the laws of armed conflict to act in Syria against the 
Islamic State. 
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may react to threats and acts of violence by other State and non-State 
actors, including when they may act, and even how they may react.  One 
step outside the bounds of these laws could leave the U.S. and other 
coalition forces walking a very thin line between what is and is not 
lawful under international law, potentially resulting in vast devastation 
for U.S. international relations and for the safety of American troops 
abroad. 
To understand the current situation between the U.S. and IS, this 
article will first describe the history of IS and its ideology, while tracking 
its movements and actions through Iraq and Syria since June 2014.  Next, 
this article answers the question of whether the U.S. has a legal basis 
under the laws of armed conflict to act against IS in Syria.  In answering 
this question, this article analyzes each of the three options that allow for 
action under international law: consent, United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) authorization, and self-defense under Article 51 of the United 
Nations (U.N.) Charter.  Lastly, this article lays out the way forward for 
the U.S. in dealing with the continuing presence of and threats by IS. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 
IS has an interesting history in comparison to other terrorist 
organizations because the organization can be traced back to its 
origination.  While it is difficult to trace the roots of many terrorist 
organizations, IS can be directly traced back to the Sunni terrorist 
organization al-Qaeda, and specifically the Iraq faction, al-Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI).15 This faction of al-Qaeda, previously led by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, “was responsible for scores of bombings, kidnappings and 
beheadings in Iraq following the U.S. invasion” in 2003.16  Al-Zarqawi 
was subsequently killed by an American airstrike in 2006, leaving AQI 
without a leader.17  Zarqawi’s successor, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, also 
known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri, formed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 
and appointed Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as the leader.18  In 2010, U.S. and 
Iraqi forces killed al-Masri in Tikrit.19  Following the deaths of al-Masri 
                                                                                                             
15 Lee Ferran & Rym Momtaz, ISIS Trail of Terror, ABC NEWS (last updated Feb. 23, 
2015), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/fullpage/isis-trail-terror-isis-threat-us-25053190. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 COL. S.C. DHIMAN (RET’D.), ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) 
RECONCILIATION, DEMOCRACY AND TERROR 130 (2015). 
19 2 Most Wanted Al-Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Killed by U.S., Iraqi Forces, FOX NEWS 
(Apr 19, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/04/19/iraqi-al-qaeda-leader-killed-
countrys-intelligence-team-pm-maliki-says/. 
2015-16]     RIGHT TO ACT: UNITED STATES BASIS TO PURSUE ISIS IN SYRIA 5 
 
and Omar al-Baghdadi, a well-known and experienced Iraqi fighter 
named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over leadership of AQI/ISI.20 
In 2007, a large alliance of Iraqi Sunni tribes supported by U.S. 
forces fought against the jihadist group in what is now known as the 
“Sunni Awakening.”21  AQI/ISI was significantly weakened after this 
fight, becoming seemingly non-existent until 2011.22  In an attempt to 
regain its power and expand its ranks in 2011, amidst the Syrian Civil 
War, AQI/ISI moved into Syria.23  From 2011 to 2013, AQI/ISI regained 
power under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and was able to re-
establish influence in Iraq.24  At the same time in 2013, al-Baghdadi 
changed the group’s name from AQI/ISI to the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria to “reflect[] its greater regional ambitions.”25 
In April 2013, al-Baghdadi “called upon all jihadis in Iraq and the 
‘Levant’ to unite under his organization, ISIS, and form an Islamic 
state.”26 Abu Muhammad al-Joulani, leader of Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, 
rejected the merger and re-affirmed his allegiance directly to al-Qaeda 
leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri.27  In an attempt to intervene and prevent any 
unrest between the jihadist groups, al-Zawahiri gave Syria to al-Joulani 
and Jabhat al-Nusra, and Iraq to al-Baghdadi and ISIS. However, this 
attempt to avoid fracturing failed, which left a wide division among ISIS, 
Jabhat al-Nusra, and al-Qaeda.28  While ISIS’s goals and ideology 
remain very similar to those of al-Qaeda, the two groups are not 
affiliated and do not share a coordinated command relationship or 
command structure.29  In fact, there is severe tension and competition 
between Jabhat al-Nusra  and ISIS for local control in Syria.30 
In February 2014, al-Zawahiri, on behalf of al-Qaeda, formally 
renounced any involvement with ISIS.31 Al-Zawahiri’s renunciation 
stemmed primarily from the attempts of ISIS to set up mini-Islamic 
                                                                                                             
20 Ferran & Momtaz, supra note 15 (noting that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is also known 
by the name Abu Du’a). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Dhiman, supra note 18, at 131. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.  
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Mark Memmott, Al-Qaida Says It Has No Ties With One Syrian Rebel Force, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 3, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/02/03
/270937603/al-qaida-says-it-has-no-ties-with-one-syrian-rebel-force. This complete 
renunciation came after al-Zawahiri had warned ISIS to stop its activities in Syria a year 
prior. 
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states in Iraq and Syria and the imposition of harsh rules on the local 
population by ISIS.32  On June 29, 2014, ISIS again changed its name to 
the “Islamic State” after “declaring a new caliphate with Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi as Caliph Ibrahim and ‘leader of Muslims everywhere.’”33 IS 
demanded allegiance from all active jihadist groups, putting IS in direct 
competition with al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups.34  
III.  THE ISLAMIC STATE’S IDEOLOGY 
On September 10, 2014, the President of the United States stated, 
“Now let’s make two things clear: ISIL is not ‘Islamic.’  No religion 
condones the killing of innocents.”35  This statement is somewhat 
inaccurate as IS does follow Islam; however, it is a very extreme 
interpretation of the Islamic religion that many other Muslims do not 
condone or follow.36  Perhaps, statements and understandings such as 
this demonstrate the U.S.’s misunderstanding of IS and why the group 
acts the way it does.37  It is important to understand IS’s theology and 
ideology in order to truly understand IS’s motivations and ultimately 
determine if IS poses a threat to the U.S. 
IS is very much Islamic. IS follows a movement in Islamic political 
thought known as Jihadi-Salafism, or jihadism;38 which it describes as 
“the Prophetic methodology.”39 This methodology includes “following 
the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail.”40 IS 
adheres explicitly to this movement.41  In fact, “The movement is 
predicated on an extremist and minoritarian reading of Islamic scripture 
that is also textually rigorous, deeply rooted in a pre-modern theological 
                                                                                                             
32 Id. 
33 Dhiman, supra note 18. 
34 Id. 
35 Barack Obama, Pres. of the United States, Statement by the President on ISIL (Sept. 
10, 2014, 9:01 PM), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09
/10/statement-president-isil-1. 
36 See Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers
/2015/03/ideology-of-islamic-state-bunzel/the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf; See also 
Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC (March 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/. 
37 Id. 
38 Bunzel, supra note 36, at 7. 
39 Wood, supra note 36. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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tradition, and exclusively elaborated by a recognized cadre of religious 
authorities.”42 
A portion of the movement can be traced back to the Muslim 
Brotherhood.43  The Brotherhood believed in “the restoration of the 
caliphate as the ideal system of government for the Islamic world, a 
popular theme in the earlier 20th century.”44  While the Brotherhood 
spoke at length about the caliphate and the need for the Muslim 
community to unite under one leader of an Islamic state, in practice, the 
Brotherhood did not actually restore a caliphate and, in fact, seemed 
indifferent to the idea.45 The connection between IS and the Brotherhood 
is evidenced by IS’s June 2014 declaration of al-Baghdadi as Caliph 
Ibrahim and leader of Muslims everywhere.46  For IS, uniting the Muslim 
community under one leader, creating the Islamic State, and restoring the 
caliphate was, and is, an immediate goal of the organization. 
The second part of IS’s ideology is traced back to Salafism, “a 
primarily theological movement in Sunni Islam . . . .”47 Accordingly, 
“Salafism focuses on eliminating idolatry (shirk) and affirming God’s 
Oneness (tawhid).”48  Salafis consider themselves to be the only true 
Muslims.49  IS follows the theology of Salafi and exemplifies the Salafi 
character of the jihadi movement; however, in contrast to al-Qaeda, who 
also follows the same theology, IS does so with greater severity.50  In 
fact, IS is unwavering in its absolute and uncompromising views on 
doctrinal matters, “prioritizing the promotion of an unforgiving strain of 
Salafi thought.”51  IS’s extreme adherence to this version of Jihadi-
Salafism can be traced to al-Zarqawi, the founder of AQI, “who studied 
theology with the prominent jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi.”52  The Salafi influences have been present in IS since its 
inception, tracing back to al-Baghdadi, al-Muhajir, and the current 
spokesperson for IS, al-Adnani.53 
IS emphasizes numerous Salafi doctrinal concepts, but the most 
prominent is that “all Muslims must associate exclusively with fellow 
                                                                                                             
42 Bunzel, supra note 36, at 7. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 8. 
45 Id. (quoting statements that “Building a caliphate was more a long-term goal than an 
immediate goal.”). 
46 Wood, supra note 36. 
47 Bunzel, supra note 36, at 8. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 9. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 10. 
53 Id. 
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true Muslims and dissociate from anyone not fitting this narrow 
definition; failure to rule in accordance with God’s law constitutes 
unbelief; all Shi’a Muslims are apostates54 deserving of death; and the 
[Brotherhood] and Hamas are traitors against Islam.”55  Compared to al-
Qaeda, IS is much more unbending in its application of Salafism, 
resulting in the increased acts of extreme and arbitrary violence, such as 
gruesome beheadings.56 
IS also differs from al-Qaeda in that it promotes offensive and 
defensive jihad.57  Contrarily, al-Qaeda focuses on defensive jihad, 
promoting only what it classifies as defensive military acts.58  Offensive 
jihad focuses on the “the uprooting of shirk, idolatry, wherever it is 
found.”59  In 2007, al-Baghdadi stated, “the end to which fighting the 
unbelievers leads is no idolater (mushrik) remaining in the world.”60  Al-
Baghdadi also emphasized the importance of offensive jihad by stating, 
“going after the apostate unbelievers by attacking [them] in their home 
territory, in order to make God’s word most high and until there is no 
persecution.”61 
Finally, IS follows the Islam practice of takfir, or 
excommunication.62  IS has committed its organization “to purifying the 
world by killing vast numbers of people.”63  Muslim apostates are the 
most common victims, and any Christians who resist the IS government 
or creation of an Islamic State are also targeted.64  Anyone who does not 
adhere to their interpretation of Islam are considered nonbelievers and 
are thus subjected to becoming targets.65 
                                                                                                             
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 11. 
57 Id. at 10. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. (defining persecution as meaning idolatry). 
62 Id. at 30. 
63 Wood, supra note 36. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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IV.  TAKE OVER OF SYRIA AND IRAQ, JUNE 2014 TO PRESENT: AN 
OVERVIEW 
On June 10, 2014, IS overtook the Iraqi city of Mosul.66  Shortly 
after this, IS officially declared itself the Islamic State, due to the number 
of captured Iraqi and Syrian territories over which it maintained 
control.67  At this time, IS also executed a number of clerics in Mosul 
because they would not pledge their allegiance to IS.68  On June 23, 
2014, IS also overtook the northern city of Tal Afar and an airport in 
Iraq, which ignited the IS expansion into northern Iraq.69  Throughout 
July 2014, IS grew and captured more land in Iraq.70 
During these months, IS also increased its presence in Syria.71  IS 
began to sell oil and gas products from captured Syrian oil fields to Iraq, 
attempting “to supply electricity and build state funds in the appointed 
‘capital’ of the Islamic State, Raqqa, Syria.”72  Accordingly, “All the 
cities between Deir Ezzor city and the Iraq border” fell to IS by July 3, 
2014.73  Furthermore, IS claimed to have killed 270 people after seizing 
the Shaer gas field of al-Omar.74 
On August 7, 2014, the President of the United States authorized 
airstrikes against IS after the U.S. learned of the threat to the Yazidi 
minority, who were trapped in deplorable and life-threatening conditions 
on Mt. Sinjar, Iraq.75 The airstrike allowed tens of thousands of Yazidis 
to escape the mountain, but thousands remained trapped as IS continued 
its push into northern Iraq.76  Following this event, airstrikes continued 
                                                                                                             
66 AWR Hawkins, U.S. Escalates Military Action in Iraq: A Timeline, BREITBART 
NEWS NETWORK (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2014/08/
24/u-s-escalates-military-action-in-iraq-a-timeline/. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. (explaining that the U.S. increased surveillance over Baghdad due to IS’s growth, 
anticipating an attack against the capital city. Drone flights over Baghdad increased from 
one drone flight a day to 50). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 ISIS Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/ (last 
updated July 20, 2015). 
74 Id. Al-Omar is the largest oil field in Syria, producing roughly 75,000 barrels of oil 
daily. Group: ISIS Takes Major Syrian Oil Field, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/03/world/meast/syria-isis-oil-field/ (last updated July 3 
2014). 
75 Hawkins, supra note 66 (explaining that IS deemed the Yazidis “devil worshippers” 
and chased the Yazidis up Mt. Sinjar in an attempt to extinguish the religious minority. 
The only choice the Yazidis had was to stay on the mountain and die of starvation or 
thirst or descend the mountain and be slaughtered by the awaiting IS militants). 
76 Id. 
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with the U.S. strategically targeting IS in various locations.77  The 
airstrikes reportedly destroyed or damaged “multiple [IS] ‘fighting 
positions’ and ‘checkpoints,’ as well as numerous ‘armed vehicles,’ 
‘armored personnel carriers,’ and a ‘vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft gun,’ 
amongst other things.”78 
On August 19, 2014, IS released footage of the beheading of 
captured American journalist, James Foley.79  IS stated “his beheading 
was brought about by Obama’s decision to strike IS positions and 
pledged that they would behead others if the strikes continued.”80  At that 
time, IS held another American journalist, Steven Sotloff, captive and 
indicated he would be next if the U.S. continued the airstrikes.81  
Unfortunately, on September 2, 2014, IS released yet another video, this 
time of the beheading of Sotloff.82  Then again, on September 13, 2014, 
IS posted a video that showed the execution of British aid worker, David 
Haines.83  In the video, IS warned the British Prime Minister David 
Cameron that the destruction would continue as long as Britain continued 
its “evil alliance with America.”84  At the end of the video, IS threatened 
the life of Alan Henning, another British citizen held captive by IS.85  On 
October 3, 2014, IS released yet another video showing the beheading of 
Henning.86  IS threatened the life of another American aid worker, Peter 
Kassig, also known as Abdul-Rahman Kassig.87  On November 16, 2014, 
IS reported that it beheaded Kassig as it had promised in earlier videos.88 
IS continued to plague Iraq throughout November 2014, allegedly 
killing 322 members of the Albu Nimr tribe near the town of Hit. 89  In 
                                                                                                             
77 Id. 
78 Id. (reporting that during this time, IS also secured the Iraqi city of Shingal. During 
the raid of Shingal, IS took 500 girls and women as “war booty.” IS drove the young, 
attractive women out of the city in trucks to be slaves, and killed the older women, 
dumping their bodies in the streets). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 ISIS FAST FACTS, supra note 73. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. (reporting that IS blamed the beheading on the United Kingdom’s partnering 
with the U.S. in the bombing campaign against IS in Syria and Iraq). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. In September 2014, the Central Intelligence Agency announced that U.S. 
analysts estimated IS to have reached the size of 20,000 to 31,500 fighters across Iraq and 
Syria. ISIS Can ‘Muster’ Between 20,000 and 31,500 Fighters, CIA Says, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq/ (last updated Sept. 12, 
2014). 
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late January 2015, IS demanded $200 million from Japan for the release 
of two Japanese hostages, Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa. 90  Later in 
January 2015, IS posted a video online showing Goto holding a picture 
of the beheaded Yukawa. 91  A voice in the video demanded the release 
of the terrorist suspect Sajida al-Rishawi from Jordan, in exchange for 
the release of Goto. 92 On January 31, 2015, IS released a video showing 
the decapitated body of Goto.93 
Yet again, on February 3, 2015, IS released a video online depicting 
the Jordanian military pilot, Moath al-Kasasbeh, being burned alive 
while confined in a cage.94  This atrocity sparked Jordanian airstrikes 
against IS positions in Syria that reportedly damaged or destroyed IS 
training centers and arms and ammunition caches in the de facto capital 
of Raqqa.95  IS threats and acts of violence continued throughout 
February 2015, with the confirmation of the death of American hostage, 
Kayla Jean Mueller, the beheading of 21 Egyptian Christians on a Libyan 
beach, and the parading of 21 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in cages down 
Iraqi streets.96 
In March 2015, IS continued its devastation of Iraq and Syria by 
destroying antiquities at the Mosul Museum, throwing a man off a 
building in Raqqa for allegedly being homosexual, and bulldozing the 
site of the ancient city of Nimrud.97  To make matters worse, on March 7, 
2015, Abubakar Shekau, leader of Boko Haram, pledged allegiance to 
IS.98  Only a few days later, on March 12, 2015, al-Adnani announced 
that the caliphate had expanded into western Africa and that al-Baghdadi 
had accepted Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance.99  That same day, IS 
bombed the Iraqi army headquarters in north Ramadi, killing at least 40 
Iraqi soldiers.100 
V.  LEGAL BASES UNDER THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 
Now that it is clear who IS is, the ideology it follows, and the 
devastation it has caused in the Middle East since June 2014, this article 
                                                                                                             
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
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turns to addressing whether the U.S. has a legal basis under the laws of 
armed conflict to pursue IS in Syria.  Under the law of armed conflict, to 
pursue IS within the borders of Syria, the U.S. must either have the 
consent of Syria to enter its country, the authorization to use force by the 
U.N. Security Council, or a legal basis under one of the theories of self-
defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.  This article first addresses 
the basis of consent. 
 1.  Consent 
Generally, the use of force by a State in the territory of another State 
is prohibited under the U.N. Charter and customary international law. 
Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter states: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII.101 
Simply put, this means that if a State requests the assistance of a 
fellow State or ally, that fellow State or ally is free to use force within the 
boundaries of the requesting nation. 
Currently, Syria has not expressly given the U.S. permission to go 
after IS within its borders.102  In fact, in a press conference held on 
August 25, 2014, the Syrian foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem, warned 
the U.S. “not to conduct airstrikes inside Syria against the Islamic State 
without the Syrian government’s consent,” stating that “any such attack 
would constitute an act of aggression.”103  While these comments seemed 
to pre-empt any U.S. action in Syria, al-Moallem also stated that “Syria 
is ready to co-operate and co-ordinate on the regional and international 
level in the war on terror, but any effort to combat terrorism should be 
co-ordinated with the Syrian government.”104 
It remains clear that Syria has not expressly given consent for the 
U.S. to act within its borders. However, some legal scholars argue that 
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Syria may have given implied consent105 based on statements from 
Syrian government spokespersons, that “we are facing an enemy.  We 
should cooperate.”106  To support this argument, international legal 
scholars point to the fact that “Syria has made no effort to interfere with 
the operations in spite of the US notifying it of the attacks prior to their 
launch.”107  In fact, in late 2014, Syria submitted several letters to the 
U.N. complaining about bombings by Israel, hostile actions by Turkey 
within its borders, U.N. support for non-government organizations 
providing humanitarian assistance, and the arming and training of rebel 
groups within its borders, but Syria failed to complain about the U.S. 
airstrikes against IS.108  The absence of complaints to the U.N. over U.S. 
airstrikes coupled with statements from Syrian government officials, like 
“U.S.-led air strikes against militants are going in the ‘right direction’ 
because the [Syrian] government had been informed before they started 
and they were not hitting civilians or Syrian military targets,” 
demonstrates that Syria may very well be implying consent based on its 
actions, or inability to act, and statements.109 
Additionally, on September 29, 2014, al-Moallem addressed the 
U.N. General Assembly and many observers stated that his comments 
“appeared to give tacit approval of U.S. and Arab airstrikes in 
Syria.”110Al-Moallem specifically stated that IS was “unleashed like a 
monster against Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.  Let us together stop this 
ideology and its exporters.”111  Anything that remained tacit in al-
Moallem’s September 29, 2014 comments to the U.N. Assembly became 
much clearer in an interview with Associated Press on that same day.  In 
that interview, al-Moallem stated that “the U.S.-led bombing campaign 
should be expanded to target other militant groups besides the Islamic 
State group, noting that the fight against terrorism has aligned the Syrian 
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regime with its Western and Arab opponents in a fight against a common 
enemy.”112 
Furthermore, U.S. strikes against IS obviously benefit Syria because 
IS continues to be one of the Syrian government’s most powerful 
opponents; therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the Syrian 
government does not vehemently oppose the U.S. operations taking place 
within its borders.113  It must be noted that making an argument based on 
implied consent would be very contentious amongst the international 
community, as the theory of implied consent is not codified in 
international law and the theory is not widely accepted by the 
international legal community.114  Interestingly enough, the U.N. General 
Secretary, Ban Ki-Moon, addressing the U.S. basis for airstrikes in Syria 
on September 23, 2014, stated “I am aware that today’s strikes were not 
carried out at the direct request of the Syrian Government, but I note that 
the Government was informed beforehand.”115 
All in all, the U.S. relationship with Syria, particularly with regard to 
the issue presented by IS, is murky at best. One thing is very clear: Syria 
has not expressly consented to U.S. action within its borders against IS.  
On another note, there is an argument to be made that based upon Syria’s 
actions, or inability to act, public statements, and acquiesce to U.S. 
airstrikes in Syria, Syria has effectively given implied consent for the 
U.S. to act within its borders to pursue IS.  Whether the international 
legal community would largely accept this argument remains a mystery, 
but the U.S. does have a compelling argument based upon the evidence 
that exists of Syria’s acquiesce to U.S. action. 
2.  U.N. Security Council Authorization 
The second basis under which a State may enter another sovereign 
State, and act without consent, is pursuant to UNSC authorization.  
Article 24 of the U.N. Charter states “Members confer on the Security 
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their own behalf.”116  Article 
43 states “All Members of the [U.N.], in order to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make 
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a 
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special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, 
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security.”117  In short, the UNSC maintains 
international peace and security throughout the world and, in return, 
Member States agree to abide by and carry out UNSC resolutions.118 
The UNSC has not issued a United Nations Security Resolution 
(UNSCR) directly giving Member States of the U.N. Charter the 
authority to use force in Syria against IS; however, the UNSC has issued 
a couple other resolutions that deal primarily with the continuing 
presence of IS in the Middle East. What is missing from these resolutions 
is the ever important language of “‘all necessary means to restore 
international peace and security and request[s] all States to provide 
appropriate support to do so.”119  When this language is present in a 
Security Council resolution, the Member States are authorized to use 
force to carry out the central intent of the resolution.120 Without this 
language, the Member States are not authorized to use force. If they seek 
to use force, it must be justified by one of the other two legal bases 
provided for by the law of armed conflict, or they risk being in violation 
of international law. 
On August 15, 2014, the UNSC passed UNSCR 2170, dealing 
directly with extremist groups located in Iraq and Syria.121  This was one 
of the few resolutions passed since 2014, in an effort to combat the 
overwhelming and disastrous presence of extremist groups in Iraq and 
Syria, specifically IS.  This Resolution expressly provided for “all United 
Nations Member States to act to suppress the flow of foreign fighters, 
financing and other support to Islamist extremist groups in Iraq and 
Syria.”122 The UNSC “condemn[ed] in the strongest terms what it called 
‘gross, systematic and widespread abuse’ of human rights by the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant.”123  This resolution was unanimously 
adopted by the Member States.124 
In addition to calling on Member States to “take national measures to 
suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters” and the UNSC’s 
willingness to issue sanctions for any States found to be in violation of 
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the Resolution, UNSCR 2170 also added six persons to its terrorist 
sanctions list.125  Al-Baghdadi, the leader of IS, was not included on the 
list, because he has been on the terrorist sanctions list since 2011.126 
UNSCR 2170 included bold language cautioning the extremist groups in 
Iraq and Syria to stop the deplorable actions they were committing 
against humanity, and urging the other Member States to stop any 
assistance, whether directly or indirectly, to these groups.127 However, 
what this Resolution did not provide for was the right to use force against 
the extremist groups for the crimes they were committing against 
humanity. 
Most recently, the UNSC passed UNSCR 2199 on February 12, 
2015.128  This Resolution targets funding streams for the Islamic State.129  
The USCR urged “global cooperation ‘to impair, isolate and 
incapacitate’ terrorist threats.”130  The UNSC condemned those buying 
oil from the Islamic State, banned all trade in looted antiquities from Iraq 
and Syria, and called upon States to end ransom payments.131  The 
Russian-led resolution was adopted unanimously, garnering the support 
of 35 countries.132 Jackie Northam, reporter for National Public Radio, 
characterized this Resolution as “a rare show of unity between the U.S. 
and Russia, which is the measure’s primary sponsor.”133  Russia’s 
ambassador to the U.N., Vitaly Churkin, said, “the resolution was an 
important step to suppressing the terrorist threat that’s felt far beyond 
Syria, Iraq and other nations in the Middle East.”134 
The Resolution condemns any trade, directly or indirectly, with the 
extremist group, particularly trade of oil, oil products and modular 
refineries.135  The UNSC emphasized that any trade by a country with IS 
would be interpreted as support by that country of IS and that country 
would face possible sanctions from the UNSC.136  The UNSC further 
recognized that “oilfields, as well as other infrastructure such as dams 
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and power plants, controlled by ISIL . . . ‘are generating a significant 
portion of the groups’ income, alongside extortion, private foreign 
donations, kidnap ransoms and stolen money from the territory they 
control.”137 
The UNSC has taken steps to combat the issues present in Iraq and 
Syria due to the overwhelming presence of IS and other extremist groups 
in the region. However, it has failed to go so far as to authorize the use of 
force in the fight against IS in Iraq and Syria.  While it is clear that the 
Council is directing its efforts at combating IS in the most civil and non-
hostile way possible, ultimately, the resolutions it has passed do not seem 
to be affecting the operations of IS, as it continues to plague Syria and 
Iraq.  IS continues to overrun Syria, continues to recruit foreign fighters 
to build its militia, and continues to cause the death of innocent civilians 
in the name of Islam. Furthermore, there has not been any indication by 
the UNSC thus far, regarding if and when an authorization for the use of 
force will occur. 
3.  Article 51 
Article 51 states “[n]othing in this present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the [U.N.], until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security . . . .”138  Article 51 requires that an armed attack occur before a 
State can act in self-defense.139  But that begs the question, what is an 
“armed attack?”  While there is no agreed upon definition, it is important 
to look at the facts and circumstances of each individual attack to assess 
whether an armed attack has occurred.140  For example, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) “decided that Nicaragua’s provision of arms to the 
opposition in El Salvador was not an armed attack.”141  To qualify as an 
armed attack, the attack must be more than isolated criminal acts against 
a state’s citizens no matter how brutal the attacks may be.142 
Some members of the international legal community, to include the 
United States, also support a position that a State can attack in self-
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defense when an armed attack is imminent, but has not yet occurred.143  
The debate of what does or does not constitute an “armed attack” is not 
the focus of this article.  For the purposes of this article, it is important to 
know and understand what Article 51 states and how that language plays 
into the analysis of whether self-defense is appropriate in any given 
situation, specifically whether the U.S. has a legal basis to enter Syria to 
pursue IS. 
There are varying theories of self-defense such as the inherent right 
to self-defense, anticipatory self-defense, interceptive self-defense, 
preventive self-defense and collective self-defense.144  This section will 
focus primarily on collective and preventive self-defense, as those are the 
most likely bases for the legal justification to use force in Syria by the 
U.S. against IS.   This article will not address the inherent right of self-
defense by the U.S. to use force against IS within Syria because at this 
point the U.S. has not expressed a concern that IS has facilitated an 
armed attack against the U.S. or that there is an imminent threat of an 
armed attack against the U.S. by IS.  In fact, the U.S. has repeatedly 
claimed that IS does not present an immediate threat to the U.S. 
homeland.145  Furthermore, “many experts note that the Islamic State, 
despite its clever anti-U.S. bluster to lure the United States into attacking 
it, is more a threat to the Middle East and neighboring countries than it is 
to U.S. territory” because IS “is focused on establishing an Islamic state 
in Iraq and Syria rather than attacking the U.S.”146 
This same argument applies to the theory of anticipatory self-
defense.147 Without evidence that IS poses an imminent threat to the 
U.S., the U.S. does not have the right to claim anticipatory self-defense 
against IS within the borders of Syria.148  Without an armed attack or an 
imminent armed attack, the U.S. has no legal justification to rely on the 
inherent right of self-defense or anticipatory self-defense to use force 
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against IS within the Syrian borders.  For these reasons, these two 
theories are not addressed in detail as part of this article. 
In discussing these varying bases for self-defense, it is important to 
remember that the U.S. has articulated on many occasions that it believes 
there exists an international legal basis for the U.S. to act in Syria against 
IS. For example, Samantha Power, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., stated 
“the United States has the legal right to launch Syrian strikes without the 
[U.N. Security Council’s] explicit backing.149  Consistent with the U.N. 
Charter, we [think] – it would depend on the facts and circumstance of 
any particular strike in Syria – that we have the legal basis we need.”150  
National Security Council spokesperson, Caitlin Hayden also stated, 
“with respect to international law, the specific basis will depend on the 
particular facts and circumstances related to any specific military actions, 
but we believe that we will have a basis for taking action.”151  In 
addition, statements made by Iraqi and U.S. representatives to the U.N. 
indicated “the current operations in Syria against ISIS are being justified 
on the basis of collective self-defen[s]e.”152 
a.  Collective Self-Defense 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes a right of collective self-
defense.153  Collective self-defense is applicable when a State, who has 
the right to act in inherent self-defense, requests the assistance of another 
State because the requesting State is unable or unwilling to exercise its 
inherent right of self-defense on its own.154  To exercise the right of 
collective self-defense, the State entitled to act in inherent self-defense 
must explicitly request assistance from other States.155  The ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case discussed briefly above, “refused to acknowledge the 
U.S.’s claim to collective self defense because El Salvador had not 
officially requested such help.”156  The ICJ stated: 
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It is also clear that it is the State which is the victim of 
an armed attack which must form and declare the view 
that it has been so attacked.  There is no rule in 
customary international law permitting another State to 
exercise the right of collective self-defense on the basis 
of its own assessment of the situation.  Where collective 
self-defense is invoked, it is to be expected that the State 
for whose benefit this right is used will have declared 
itself to be the victim of an armed attack.157 
The U.S. government received a request from the Iraqi government 
explicitly requesting assistance from the U.S. to fight against IS.158  
According to the U.S. notification to the U.N., Iraq specifically requested 
assistance from the U.S. to “lead international efforts to strike [IS] sites 
inside Syria to suppress continuing attacks on Iraq and protect Iraqi 
citizens.”159  Based on the request from Iraq, the U.S. is acting in self-
defense on behalf of Iraq against the ongoing threat posed by IS.160  The 
threat largely emulates from IS forces within the borders of Syria and 
Syria’s seemingly inability or unwillingness to address the IS problem 
within its own border.161 
The question of whether Syria is unable or unwilling to deal with the 
threat posed by IS is highly debated.  Although Syria has not expressly 
stated that it is “unable or unwilling” in dealing with the threat posed by 
IS, as stated in the section of this article dealing with consent, its inaction 
to deal with the threat posed by IS does suggest that it is unable to.162  
The “unable or unwilling test” is a controversial part of international law, 
though it is considered a well-settled part of the U.S. government’s legal 
position.163  In fact, the U.S. relied on this theory when it entered 
Pakistan, without approval, during the operation to kill Osama bin 
Laden.164  In a letter dated September 23, 2014, addressed to the U.N. 
Secretary General, the U.S. demonstrated support for the “unable or 
unwilling” test, by stating that “states must be able to defend themselves, 
                                                                                                             
157 Nicar v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., 14 ¶¶ 187 – 201. 
158 Jennifer Daskal et al, Strikes in Syria: The International Law Framework, JUST 
SECURITY (Sept. 24, 2014, 8:01 AM), http://justsecurity.org/15479/strikes-syria-
international-law-framework-daskal-deeks-goodman/. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Ryan Goodman, International Law on Airstrikes against ISIS in Syria, JUST 
SECURITY (Aug. 28, 2013, 12:27 PM), http://justsecurity.org/14414/international-law-
airstrikes-isis-syria/. 
164 Id. 
2015-16]     RIGHT TO ACT: UNITED STATES BASIS TO PURSUE ISIS IN SYRIA 21 
 
in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-
defense as reflected in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, when, as is the 
case here, the government of the state where the threat is located is 
unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks.”165 
Comments like those made by Ban Ki-Moon, in his statement on 
September 23, 2014, admitting that “the strikes took place in areas no 
longer under the effective control of that [Syrian] Government,” support 
the position that Syria is unable to deal with the threat posed by IS.166  
Ki-Moon further stated, “I think it is undeniable – and the subject of 
broad international consensus – that these extremist groups pose an 
immediate threat to international peace and security.”167  U.S. Secretary 
of State, John Kerry, recognized the inability of the Syrian government 
to handle the continued threat posed by IS within its borders, stating “We 
[U.S.] are going to do what they [Syria] haven’t done, what they had 
plenty of opportunity to do, which is to take on ISIL and to degrade it 
and eliminate it as a threat.”168  While the U.S may have an uphill battle 
in persuading the international legal community to accept this argument, 
there is evidence to support the argument that Syria is unable to handle 
the threat posed by IS within its borders. 
Because Iraq has requested U.S. assistance in combating the threat 
posed by IS, and there exists a strong argument that Syria is unable to 
combat the threat posed by IS with its borders, the U.S. has a strong legal 
argument that it can pursue IS in Syria, relying on the theory of 
collective self-defense.169  “So long as the force used is necessary to 
protect against the direct threat that [IS] posed to Iraq, and that the 
amount and nature of force is proportionate to suppressing that threat,” 
then U.S. actions in Syria are legally supportable under the law of armed 
conflict.170  Given that IS has rapidly advanced in Iraq, due in large part 
to the support flowing into Iraq from Syria, and the Syrian government is 
unable to handle IS on its own, there exists a necessity for the U.S. to act 
in defense of Iraq.171 
                                                                                                             
165 Marty Lederman, The War Powers Resolution and Article 51 Letters Concerning 
Use of Force in Syria Against ISIL and the Khorasan Group, JUST SECURITY (Jun. 17, 
2015, 7:15 PM) http://justsecurity.org/15436/war-powers-resolution-article-51-letters-
force-syria-isil-khorasan-group/. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Rebecca Kaplan, John Kerry: “We are at war” with ISIS, CBS NEWS (Sept. 14, 
2014, 9:04 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-kerry-we-are-at-war-with-isis/. 
169 See Daskal et al., supra note 158. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
22 U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. [Vol. VI:1 
 
At first, the U.S. only targeted IS bases, training camps, and IS-
controlled transit points into Iraq.172 These strikes and any other strikes 
on similar targets are and would be proportionate to suppressing the 
threat posed by IS to Iraq.173 However, since January 2015, the U.S. has 
conducted airstrikes and targeted IS controlled areas of Syria that are not 
near the Iraq-Syria border.174  This raises the question of whether this is 
legally permissible under the basis of collective self-defense. 
Under this theory, it is quite clear that the U.S. can do what is 
necessary to secure Iraq’s border with Syria and protect Iraqi civilians 
from IS. However, it becomes more complex when determining whether 
the U.S. may act in Syria. As discussed previously, because it is 
extremely likely that Syria is unable to combat IS on its own, this 
provides the U.S. the ammunition to argue that it has a legal basis to act 
on behalf of Syria under the theory of collective self-defense.  This 
theory allows the U.S. to act within Syria’s borders so long as the attacks 
meet the other requirements of international law.  While the U.S. has not 
expressly stated upon which basis it is acting under in conducting 
airstrikes in Syria, neither the UNSC nor any other country or 
international group have questioned its actions, to include the Syrian 
government.  If questions were to be raised, it is likely that the U.S. has a 
good argument under the theory of collective self-defense to justify its 
actions in Syria. 
b.  Preventive Self-Defense 
The theory of preventive self-defense applies when a State “acts to 
prevent a potential attack before it is imminent or even capable of being 
launched.”175  While Israel justified its use of force against Iraq in 1981 
using this theory of self-defense, it was not widely accepted by the 
international community until twenty years later, when President George 
W. Bush articulated U.S. support of preventive self-defense in the 2002 
U.S. National Security Strategy.176  The strategy stated: 
We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their 
terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use 
weapons of mass destruction against the United States 
and our allies and friends . . . .We must adapt the 
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and 
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objectives of today’s adversaries . . .  The United States 
has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to 
counter a sufficient threat to our national security.  The 
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and 
the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory 
action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains 
as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.  To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, 
the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.177 
Even though preventive self-defense appears to be a viable option at 
first glance, due to previous overreaching and abuse of this doctrine by 
the Bush Administration during the unprovoked invasion of Iraq in 2002, 
present reliance on preventive self-defense to justify the use of force is 
frowned upon by the international community due to the high probability 
of abuse.178  This would not be a viable option for the U.S. since there 
would likely be much turmoil and animosity in the international 
community over the U.S.’s use of this theory to re-enter a Middle Eastern 
country, when there is not an apparent armed attack or imminent threat 
of attack against the U.S. 
VI.  WAY FORWARD 
The current state of affairs between the U.S., Syria, Iraq, IS, other 
coalition forces, and the U.N. is in a constant state of flux.  On any given 
day, the relationship between all of these parties could drastically 
change, causing the facts to provide a legal basis for intervention under 
the inherent right of self-defense, anticipatory self-defense, or the 
issuance of UNSCR.179  The analysis under any one of these distinct 
bases is very fact and circumstance dependent.  Due to the facts and 
circumstances that currently present themselves, the two legitimate 
arguments that can be made under international law by the U.S. to act in 
Syria to pursue IS are: 1) Syria has given implied consent to the U.S. to 
act within its borders to combat IS; or 2) the U.S. has the right to use 
collective self-defense on behalf of Iraq.  Now, it is important to keep in 
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mind that acting under collective self-defense presents limited options of 
what the U.S. may do to further Iraq’s security.  In sum, the U.S. has a 
legal basis under the law of armed conflict to act within Syria’s borders 
to combat the ongoing threats posed by IS. 
